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Illegal Peace? Power Sharing with Warlords in Africa
By Jeremy Levin
The price of apathy towards public affairs is to be ruled by evil men.

? Plato
This paper examines the legality of power-sharing in Africa with specific reference to

Accra and Lome accords, which brought about a fragile cessation of the conflicts in Lib

and Sierra Leone, respectively. It examines the future of international criminal law vis

power-sharing by prospectively examining gaps in state practice and rules that arg

permit the "crime of illegal peace" by insurrectionists, political elites, and moral guara

When warlords use violence to coerce democratically constituted governments to

power, does power-sharing simply become a euphemism for "guns for jobs"? Which leg

rules, if any, govern peace agreements in internal conflicts? Specifically, which rules reg

power-sharing? Are the aims of peace, justice, and adherence to the rule of law attaina
let alone compatible, with coerced political transitions where warlords violently force
cratically constituted or legitimate governments to share power? Should international

criminalize political elites that share power with warlords and rebels that have commit

gross human rights and humanitarian law violations?
Consider this scenario: a rebel group, through brutal force, coerces a democratically ele

government into a power-sharing arrangement that not only refashions the constituti

the order, but confers on the rebels unconditional amnesty, key government positions

other privileges. Although the incumbent government prefers to punish the rebels rather

negotiate with them, it shares power out of political necessity and expediency because
lacks the muscle to defeat the rebels on the battlefield and the status or legitimacy to mo

international military assistance to impose its political prerogatives. The failure to neg

a cessation of hostilities inevitably results in prolonged conflict, anarchy, and the even
toppling of the government.
Variations on this scenario have been commonplace in Africa for decades. Governmen

that have been violently and successfully challenged from within, but are still recognize

the de jure representative of the state, are faced with the quandary of how best to nego

peace, maintain security, survive politically, and manage future uncertainties. They are f

to make strategic choices that often create normative friction between what is legal on
hand and what is politically necessary and expedient on the other. Should peace-broker

held accountable for negotiating arrangements that violate fundamental rights? To dat

political scientists, who tend to be proponents of power-sharing and seem to ignore th
and role of law in political transitions, have controlled the debate over the legitimacy

power-sharing, which unfortunately has slipped under the radar of international lawyer

This paper was inspired by the apparent disregard for the sanctity of the rule of law i

literature on power-sharing and among decision-makers, who seem to discount its rele

altogether?especially those responsible for negotiating the Accra and Lome accords, wh

arguably prescribed illegal power-sharing irrespective of long-term social costs. To wh
extent, if any, does and should the rule of law influence the character of peace negotiati

agreements, and political transitions? To what extent should the rule of law sanction pol
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1 These remarks represent an abbreviated and modified version of an earlier essay, Jeremy I. Levitt,
Peace ? Examining the Legality of Power-sharing with Warlords and Rebels in Africa, 27 Mich. J. Int' l L. 495
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elites that broker illegal peace agreements? This paper represents a conscientious attempt to

address these questions and present a conceptual framework for examining the legal and
political efficacy of coercing democratically constituted governments into sharing power. It
seeks to define a lawful basis or approach to sharing power when governments are confronted

with the aforementioned scenario, and again ponders whether those who share power should
be held civilly or criminally liable when power is shared illegally.
This paper raises normative legal questions about the dominant logic that political power
sharing is lawful, legitimate, and unequivocally serves the public good, arguing that power
sharing deals that ignore controlling rules are unlawful and not viable. It centers on states
emerging from civil conflict and focuses on the issue of power-sharing between democratically

constituted governments, and warlords and rebels who have committed or participated in the
commission of international crimes.

Power-sharing, as opposed to amnesty, for example, is the subject here. This is a critically
important contribution given that power-sharing is more expansive and has a greater impact

on sustainable peace than amnesty, which is conceptually and practically more narrow and,
typically, a lesser but necessary element of power-sharing. In other words, amnesty may be
given without sharing power, but power-sharing without amnesty is atypical. Amnesty applies

to certain individuals and/or groups whereas power-sharing directly affects a state's entire
population, as it reconstructs or reorders the framework of governance and its future disposi

tion. This is why a discussion of the criminalization of illegal power-sharing is critically
important as power-sharing arrangements are typically long-term and systemic and determine

who will have a seat at the table of power, in what capacity, and for how long. This type
of peace raises vital questions about the governance and developmental challenges faced by
war-torn states.
The logic behind power-sharing assumes that rebels and warlords will behave and act as
good citizens once they are given authoritative positions. It presupposes that warlords can
become democrats once sanctioned with state authority. Power-sharing with warlords and
rebels also sets a negative precedent, as it sends a dangerous message to would-be insurrection

ists that violence is a legitimate means to effectuate change and obtain political power. For
these reasons, the subject of power-sharing deserves distinct analysis, separate and apart
from amnesty?particularly concerning its impact on the rule of law in post conflict societies.
I argue that when democratically constituted regimes are forced to choose between negotiat

ing peace and being violently dislodged from power, peace agreements based on the rule of
law should prevail over extralegal arrangements bom out of political necessity and expediency.

This is so because "legal peace" has fewer adverse impacts on the political order and is
more sustainable than "illegal peace." Those deciding to share power should consider not
simply political variables but also legal ones, as the law has an important regulatory role to
play: it must constrain the political aspirations of decision-makers and ensure the lawfulness

of peace deals. Political elites should be held civilly or criminally accountable for striking
deals that grossly violate international law. The point is that the rules governing the legality
of peace agreements must be adhered to, particularly when the beneficiaries of power-sharing

acquired power undemocratically and unlawfully and are likely responsible for committing
human atrocities. The logic underpinning this position raises several difficult questions for

governments under siege: Who is responsible for internal disorder, repression, and post
conflict justice? Is it immoral for a government to allow deadly conflict to continue until

"legal peace" is reached?
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These questions raise several questions about when, if ever, leaders should accept "illegal
peace.'' Should individual responsibility for repression be excused for the perceived collective
good? Should power-sharing and amnesty take precedence over retributive justice? Should
the political prerogatives of warlords and rebels supersede the fundamental civil, political,
and human rights of their victims? I believe in a victims-based approach that seeks to hold
political elites, whether professional warlords or members of government, responsible for
entering into power-sharing arrangements that continue a culture of impunity through amnesty

and sharing power.

Arguments for Power-Sharing
It may be argued that power-sharing is an effective way to give all parties stake in
governance, and that the underlining goal is to give warring factions political legitimacy and

decision-making authority in government with the hope they will stop fighting and take a
vested interest in the vitality of the state. It follows that sharing power neutralizes violent
conflict and that opening the political process serves a public good and makes an essential
contribution to any transition to lasting peace.
It may further be argued that power-sharing is necessary in states embroiled in war and
is often the only way to forestall conflict, restore the rule of law, strengthen societal support
for government, and create the political space for democratic elections and transition. Without

power-sharing, it is argued, rebels and warlords may have no incentive to negotiate peace
and will return to the battlefield for fear of political, economic, and social disenfranchisement.
Hence, governments share power to stop unwinnable wars. This type of reasoning supports

the popular notion that peace without power-sharing may not be realistic or attainable.

Arguments Against Power-Sharing
The most fundamental argument against power-sharing appears in domestic, regional,
subregional, and international law and policy: rebels, warlords, and other abusers who have
sponsored or directed atrocities or sought to capture state power violently and undemocrati
cally for economic rewards, political power, or any other reason have committed domestic
and international crimes. It follows that peace agreements, irrespective of amnesty, should
not empower these individuals to rule over their victims or wreak further havoc with the
legitimacy of state authority. Peace brokers who proscribe such remedies, particularly those
entrusted to protect the public good, should be held accountable for striking unlawful deals.
This position holds peace-makers responsible for their actions by setting a standard for what

is and is not legally permissible, and it rejects the ludicrous assumption, inherent in the
practice, that warlords and rebels are intent on becoming practicing democrats, accepting
instead the argument that power-sharing sends the signal to other would-be rebels that
violence is a viable way to obtain political power. In this sense, power-sharing in postwar
contexts connotes something far more difficult than sharing power with political opponents;

it perhaps unrealistically necessitates a societal psychology of forgiveness and with it the
ability of citizens to live and work peacefully with their enemies. Lastly, as is the case in
Liberia and Sierra Leone, power-sharing may generate "feelings of distrust towards the new
government and the political system, and encourage cynicism towards the rule of law."2
The hurdle of legitimacy, particularly as it relates to which factions will acquire authority
2 Diba Majzub, Peace or Justice? Amnesties and the International Criminal Court, 3 Melb. J. Int'l L. 251 (2002).
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over which key government portfolios (foreign affairs, defense, intelligence, internal security,

justice, and natural resources), could undermine a peaceful political transition.

The Accra and Lome Accords
The Accra and Lome Accords are composed of thirty-seven articles with similar structure
and content including cease-fire, military, human rights, implementation, and power-sharing
components. The accords did not offer any legal basis or authority to legitimize their power

sharing provisions but, rather, prescribed extra-legal rules and processes for sharing power
that abrogated constitutionally based superior rules. The only legitimizing authority for
power-sharing seems to have rested solely in the accords themselves. The accords not only
violated state authority, fundamental rights, and executive and legislative power principles
enshrined in constitution law, but also well-settled regional and international human rights
law and emerging democracy norms.3

Conclusion
In conclusion, I argue that sharing power with warlords and rebels who unseat democrati
cally constituted regimes is unlawful and that peace-makers have a legal obligation to comport

with the rule of law in making peace deals. The failure to abide by controlling rules should
result in civil, and even criminal, sanctions against peace brokers and the elites that endorse
their prescriptions. This analysis, along with empirical studies, show that power sharing with

warlords and rebels more often than not creates short-term fixes and long-term political
instability resulting in continued conflict. In order to make a long-term and "legal peace,"
decision-makers should adhere to several principles when negotiating peace arrangements:
take stock of all governing rules before beginning peace negotiations;
allow governing rules to shape and influence the character of negotiations (i.e., what

is legally permissible and what is not);
work within, not outside, the existing legal framework, using governing rules as the

minimum standard of acceptability;
be unswerving in mediatory approaches by sending consistent messages to the rele

vant parties;
seek timely international support for rule-based approaches using affirmative induce
ments such as recognition, aid, trade, and support in reforming the security sector;

ensure that peacemakers remain in control of negotiations and implementation pro
cesses and do not allow warlords to retain vetoes and rewards;
realize that the protection of human rights and democracy is integral, and not contrary,

to security and remember that international law prevails over domestic peace accords
in any conflict of law.

As Crocker and Hampson have noted, "[t]he lesson, then, is to not permit military policies
to become unhinged or detached from the broader [legal and] political purposes they are
intended to serve."4 Also, timidity in the face of armed militias is not effective?especially
when the clock is working in their favor."5 It is the concern over security and a resumption
of war that provides the best rationale not to share power with warlords and rebels who will
3 See generally id.
4 Chester Crocke & Fen Osier Hampson, Making Peace Settlements Work, Foreign Pol'y, Fall 1996, at 69.

5Id.
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undoubtedly inject criminal and predatory behavior into the political culture. International
donors and multilateral organizations taking part in negotiation processes need to serve as

legal?as opposed to moral?guarantors in order to ensure adherence to governing rules
and protect fundamental legal rights. They should hold peace-makers civilly or criminally
accountable for negotiating deals that violate fundamental human rights. States and multilat

eral institutions that sanction peace deals have a positive duty to protect human rights and
democracy and not subvert them.
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